Are women in the MENA region really that different from women in Europe? Globalization, conservative values and female labor market participation. by Fischer, Justina AV & Aydıner-Avşar, Nursel
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Are women in the MENA region really
that different from women in Europe?
Globalization, conservative values and
female labor market participation.
Justina AV Fischer and Nursel Aydıner-Avs¸ar
University of Mannheim, Gediz University
21. April 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63800/
MPRA Paper No. 63800, posted 21. April 2015 16:25 UTC
1	  
	  
Are women in the MENA region really that different from 
women in Europe?  Globalization, conservative values and 
female labor market participation 
 
 
 
Justina A.V. Fischer1 
University of Mannheim, Germany 
 
Nursel Aydıner-Avşar2 
Gediz University, Turkey 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article aims to compare women in the MENA region with women in Europe as to how globalization 
affects their conservative values and attitudes, and, thereby, their labor market participation. The authors 
define conservative values as both religious values and socio-political attitudes relating to family issues 
and leadership. Using micro data from the World Values Survey covering over 80 countries between 1981 
and 2014, we employ three distinct indicators of globalization that reflect, first, international trade, and, 
second, cross-national flows of information via persons and media. In Western Europe, during the Cold 
War period economic globalization appears to weaken those conservative values that directly pertain to 
female labor market participation, mirroring the current development in the MENA countries. After the 
Cold War, in Western Europe all remaining secular-conservative values appear equally weakened by 
international trade, possibly predicting changes to come in the MENA region. Eastern Europe appears 
distinct from the other two regions. In the MENA region, women respond to intensifying economic 
globalization with deeper religiosity, possibly as a manifestation of self-protection. Global exchange of 
information, however, weakens all kinds of conservative values in general in either region. For both 
MENA countries and Europe likewise, women who are more conservative are less likely to participate in 
the labor market. Overall, this study suggests that economic globalization transforms not only the 
economy but also those conservative values that present an obstacle to gainful employment of women.  
Keywords: Globalization, economic integration, media, female labor force participation, religion, 
conservative values, identity, MENA, Europe 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Globalization is a multi-facetted phenomenon whose dynamics and impact on the economy and 
particularly on the society are still not fully understood. Globalization exerts effects not only on 
the economy and the environment, but also on cultures, social and political systems, and human 
well-being. Although the debate has focused on mostly economic effects such as unemployment, 
growth and income inequality, the impact of globalization on values and cultural attitudes are 
very important with broader economic and social consequences. In our contribution, we draw a 
distinction between economic integration into world markets of goods and informational 
integration into world ‘markets’ of information flows.  
This chapter aims to make a contribution to our understanding of the social effects of 
globalization through the values channel. People’s values are shaped by a number of factors 
including customs, traditions and the importance one attaches to religion. First, the chapter aims 
to investigate how globalization affects women’s religious conservative values (religious belief 
and religiosity) and socio-political conservative attitudes. We then investigate how conservative 
values affect female employment. This way, we aim to contribute to the existing literature by 
extending the discussion on religion/values-female employment nexus to the role of globalization 
as a transmission mechanism. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions in the 
empirical analysis:  
1. Does globalization change women’s values, specifically their degree of conservatism?  
2. Through this value change, does globalization impact female employment? That is, do these 
values and attitudes impact women’s labor market participation decisions?  
Second, the chapter aims to answer the question whether women in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa (MENA), who are mostly Muslims, are different from women in Europe, who are mostly 
Christians, in their reactions to the forces of globalization. The empirical analysis is based on 
428’000 responses from the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted in over 80 countries 
between 1981 and 2014.  
In general, it appears that those societal changes globalization triggers nowadays in the MENA 
countries resemble the changes that Western Europe underwent during the Cold War period prior 
to1995. In light of this finding, the developments in Western Europe observed from 1995 on 
might predict future societal changes in the MENA countries for the years to come. It becomes 
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also apparent that Eastern Europe, shaped by Communism and a regaining Orthodox-
Christianism, is very much distinct from Western Europe and the MENA region likewise. 
Specifically, economic globalization that takes place in the MENA region tends to foster 
adherence to conservative-religious values, and socio-political conservative values in general. 
Only conservative values directly pertaining to labor market participation (e.g., girl’s education 
and importance of family) are weakened as MENA countries economically globalize, possibly 
reflecting an adjustment of women’s values to the transforming forces of economic integration 
and the new economic necessities that arise in the region. While a similar development of 
weakening of these secular conservative values alone is also observable for Western Europe prior 
to 1995, from 1995 on it appears that economic globalization had been destructive also to all 
remaining tested facets of women’s secular conservatism in Western Europe. Overall, the 
destruction of conservative and traditional values appears contagious.  
Globalization of information through media and the internet tends to make people more critical 
toward religion-based and secular conservative values – this is observable in both regions and all 
time periods under investigation likewise. In contrast, in the MENA countries, cross-cultural 
personal contacts e.g. through tourism and seasonal work appear to foster adherence to religious 
values. 
Finally, regarding female employment, religious values and socio-political conservative values 
appear to decrease the probability of female employment, for all three regions investigated. In 
this respect, women in the MENA region are similar to women in Western and Eastern Europe. 
Also active membership in religious groups and a high frequency of service attendance – 
expressing adhering to religious values in a formal way – reduces labor market participation. The 
restrictive influence of conservative-secular and conservative-religious values on female 
employment is found to be stable over the last 30 years.  
The findings of this study bear an important implication for socio-economic policy making in the 
MENA region. Economic globalization appears to trigger an automatism and dynamics that 
ultimately leads to increased women’s labor market participation: the forces of global economic 
integration trigger a change in women’s conservative values that bear a direct relation to their 
labor market decision and, this way, they tend to positively affect female labor market 
participation. Information available through the internet and media appears to add to this effect. 
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Obviously, non-conservative politicians wishing a stronger integration of women in their 
domestic labor markets simply need to open up their economy and society towards outside flows 
of goods and information.   
Table O: Overview and guide to regression Tables 1 through 14.  
Region MENA Western Europe Eastern Europe Regression 
tables 
Adherence to…. Religious values  
Economic globalization + x + 1, 2 
Personal contacts -/+ x x  
Informational globalization -/+ x x  
 Confidence in religious organization  
Economic globalization + x x 4 
Personal contacts + x x  
Informational globalization - - -  
 Conservative secular values (family, 
education of girls) 
 
Economic globalization - - x 7, 8, 9 
Personal contacts x - +  
Informational globalization x + -  
  < 1995   
 Other conservative secular values (divorce, 
abortion) 
7, 8, 9 
Economic glob. + - -  
Personal Contacts +  x x  
Informational globalization -  x -  
  > 1994   
 Labor market participation of women  
 MENA Western Europe Eastern Europe  
Religious values 
(Tables 1, 2) 
- - - 10 
Confidence 
(Tables 1, 2) 
- - - 10 
Conservative values (family, 
education) 
(Tables 7, 8, 9) 
- - - 13 
Conservative values (divorce, 
abortion) 
(Tables 7, 8, 9) 
- - - 13 
Active membership 
(Table 6) 
x - - 12 
Note: + and – denote positive (increasing) and negative (decreasing) impacts, respectively. x denotes no 
significant impact.  
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The structure of this contribution is as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 describes 
our novel hypotheses and describes empirical literature on the values/female labor force 
participation interaction. Section 3 provides definitions of globalization and female conservatism 
and presents the data. This is followed by the empirical analysis for the MENA region and 
Europe (Section 4). The last section 5 discusses the findings and concludes the chapter. Table O 
provides a non-numerical overview of our findings in Tables 1 through 14. 
 
  
2. BACKGROUND: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
  
2.1.How does globalization affect values? 
Human behavior, as classical economic theory assumes, is determined by two distinct features:  
individual’s ‘preferences’ and the ‘restrictions’ she faces. Preferences are commonly called 
attitudes and values by non-economists: for example, a conservative political attitude might 
imply preferring economic growth over income redistribution, or, for conservatively-minded 
women, preferring caring for family members over earning income in the labor market. Typical 
restrictions individuals face include one’s household budget (income/wage), but also other 
restrictions imposed by society such as governmental institutions and social norms.  
Globalization – the growing cross-country interaction and integration of people, companies, and 
governments – is a process that started in the 16th century with the development of fast cargo 
ships, lowering the costs of overseas transportation so that frequent and long-distance trade with 
daily goods such as food and cloths became affordable. Long-distance exchange of goods was 
also accompanied by the exchange of information. The 19th century was not only shaped by new 
techniques of over-seas communication such as telegraph lines but also by mass immigration of 
Europeans and Asians into the ‘new world’. Hence, globalization is not restricted to international 
trade and cross-national investments in a narrow sense. Globalization also includes the continuing 
movement of people across countries, be it as workers but also as tourists, the cross-national 
exchange of information, be it through personal contacts or means of modern information 
technology.   
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From a socio-psychological perspective, globalization implies that the distinction between ‘here’ 
and ‘there’, between ‘inside’ the society and ‘outside’ the society, between ‘local’ and ‘global’ 
becomes blurred: technological progress has caused a shrinking of previously decisive distances - 
not only geographic ones, but also social ones. In consequence, locally generated developments 
have an impact not only locally but also worldwide. Illustrating recent examples of what 
globalization means for ordinary people, one can include the breakdown of the US housing 
market that ultimately triggered a worldwide financial market crisis affecting almost all countries. 
Wars in the Middle East also spill over to European societies, leading to ethnic conflicts and 
unrests among their residents. Another example is the outbreak of Ebola and other similar 
diseases that emerge in developing countries and easily travel on trade and tourism routes into 
developed countries. Globalization also implies that critical information created in the Western 
hemisphere cannot be prevented from entering and diffusing into autocratic countries such as pre-
2012 Egypt, fueling local people’s demand for political change. Regarding the impact of 
economic and informational globalization on women’s values and identity we have identified a 
theoretical and empirical research gap. 
In this article, we postulate that the process of globalization challenges one’s own political views 
and values and might lead to their revision (Fischer, 2012; 2015). Through these changes in 
values and attitudes, globalization may ultimately affect people’s behavior in the economic and 
social sphere. Globalization might alter one’s values and attitudes through differing channels: 
first, through the global exchange of information, and, second, more indirectly through global 
trade.  
Our first hypothesis is that global information is used for up-dating priors – new information 
leads possibly to a revision of ones’ beliefs and social or political attitudes. More precisely, we 
conjecture that the global exchange of information leads to an updating and a revision of one’s 
own beliefs: be it through mass media, the internet or through personal contacts during travel, 
informational globalization always involves getting information on foreign governance 
structures, different ways of organizing the local economy, foreign culture, differing historical 
experiences (Fischer, 2012). For example, in Egypt, growing knowledge about democratic 
governance structure in Europe might have led to a revision by young Egyptians of how they 
evaluate their own political system. In the specific case of conservatism, gaining knowledge 
about liberal societies in other parts of the world and the challenges these societies might impose 
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on young people might lead to a revision of one’s own political and social views, making one 
either more paternalistic-conservative or more liberal. 
Our second hypothesis uses the idea that endogenous and continuously changing preferences are 
affected also by changes in the socio-economic environment in which they emerge. More 
specifically, international trade and foreign investment transform the local economy by 
generating disproportional sectoral growth, creating new industries of international specialization 
and economic opportunities. We postulate that this (changing) economic environment influences 
people’s views and attitudes: Economic globalization alters people’s values and attitudes through 
its effect on the domestic economy, to which their preferences finally (need to) adapt.  
We conjecture that women’ social and political attitudes can, in principle, react in two opposite 
ways: they might evolve either in opposition to these economic changes or in a way that supports 
them. Expressed differently, globalization might make women’s preferences more ‘labor-market-
friendly’ supporting the underlying economic transformation – or, on the opposite, globalization 
might make women’s preferences more conservative, more religious, more ‘family-oriented’, 
opposing the changes in the domestic economy. Our empirical analysis aims to investigate which 
of these two possible reactions of preferences to economic globalization prevails in the MENA 
region and Europe. 
 
2.2.  How do values shape female labor force participation? 
Women’s values shape their economic decisions through their identity, a person’s sense of self. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), in their pioneering work on the identity economics approach, argue 
that the choice of identity by individuals may be the most important economic decision because 
identity is central to behavior, and limits imposed on this choice may directly affect one’s 
economic wellbeing.1 From a gender point of view, it is argued that women will have lower labor 
force attachment than men if their identity is enhanced by work at home. Accordingly, women’s 
movement is said to increase female labor force participation by reshaping societal notions of 
femininity and the link between gender and tasks, hence redefining women’s identity (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000). Based on this theoretical framework, we argue that globalization is expected to 
influence female labor force attachment by reshaping women’s identity and the importance they 
attach to it.  
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It is important to understand the factors that affect identity as it directly influences behavior, it. 
Two key factors are cultural tradition and religion (Turner & Reynolds, 2010; cited by (Hayo & 
Caris, 2013). Both cultural tradition and religion bear direct gendered labor market implications 
by influencing men’s and women’s perception about gender division of labor at home and in the 
labor market. In a formal game-theoretic framework, Hayo and Caris (2013) show for women 
who socialized in a traditional family environment that working in the labor market leads to a 
greater loss in their female identity, negatively affecting their labor market participation. 
The impact of religion as a key determinant of identity and thus of gender equality and women’s 
socioeconomic status has long been the subject of literature especially in sociology. Religion 
affects women’s labor force participation because different religions have different life styles and 
different attitude toward gender roles and fertility behavior (Lehrer, 1995). In all religions, 
conservative groups believe that women should focus on building a virtuous home and 
upbringing their children while men should take on the role of main breadwinner and final 
decision-making authority (Hawley, 1994; cited by Glass, 2006). However, some scholars argue 
that conservative religious groups are expected to have little effect on women’s behavioral 
choices due to the diverse thinking and tolerance in these groups as well as strong economic 
incentives and constraints being faced (Glass & Nath, 2006). There is also evidence that 
traditional attitudes of women are shaped in their youth and negatively influence women’s human 
capital investment and their labor supply (Vella, 1994). 
Particularly the role of Islam in explaining the status of women in the MENA region has been an 
old debate. While some scholars attribute this outcome to Islam itself, others argue that it is not 
Islam itself but high levels of personal religiosity common in Islamic societies that leads to less 
gender egalitarian societies in the MENA region (Price, 2011). Going beyond Islam, no one 
religion stands out as consistently more gender inequitable than others, and higher religiosity, the 
intensity of belief, itself is associated with less egalitarian gender ideology after controlling for a 
country’s religion and individual religious affiliation in all religions (Seguino, 2011). Moreover, 
there appears to be reversed causality in the relation between culture/attitudes and female labor 
force participation; however, the latter affects the former with a lag (Seguino, 2007). 
National modernization policies have also had an influence on the status of women in the MENA 
region; specifically, the introduction of state-led modernization programs financed to a great 
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extent with oil export wealth impacted the whole society in MENA countries. This process of 
modernization together with pressing political and economic realities made women’s social 
mobility less limited (Haghighat, 2012). Modernization theory and development economics claim 
that transition from preindustrial agricultural economy to an early industrial urban economy and 
later to a post-industrial economy has a U-shaped effect on female labor force participation: With 
the transition to an urban, industrial economy, women’s participation in the labor market declines 
with the physical separation of work and home life, which were taking place together in the 
agricultural economy. In the latter stage of post-industrialization, with increased education and 
reduced fertility together with more job opportunities, women’s domestic responsibilities at home 
become less demanding and their participation in the labor market increases (Haghighat, 2012). 
 
2.3.  Empirical literature on female labor market participation in the MENA Region 
and Europe 
Empirical economic studies on female labor force participation have mostly centered on the role 
of supply-side factors such as demographic, socio-economic and household characteristics while 
demand-side factors and job-related characteristics received less attention. Some studies 
investigate the role of policy-related factors such as labor market regime and care-related social 
policies, particularly in the European context. Feminist economists highlight the role of gendered 
division of labor, gendered labor markets and the role of care economy in shaping women’s 
status in the labor market (Elson, 1995). Sociological studies put relatively more emphasis on the 
effect of gender attitudes and identity on female labor market attachment. This section presents 
an overview of major findings with a particular attention to the role of values and religion in 
understanding female labor force participation in MENA countries.  
In developing countries economic integration led to a feminization of labor force through the 
expansion of labor-intensive production and flexible forms of employment (Standing, 1989; 
Standing, 1999). This demand-driven process of feminization in the labor market is observable 
for the manufacturing industries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Syria, and 
Yemen, driven by private foreign ownership, exporting activities, and gender equality politics 
(Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015) (see Fischer, 2015, for a literature overview on employment effects in 
MENA countries). However, this process has been weak in the MENA region with an average 
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female labor force participation rate of 25%, well below the worldwide average of 50%. This 
regional disparity is especially puzzling when one considers that the MENA region recorded the 
fastest growth in Human Development Index since the 1970s, achieving gender parity in 
secondary school enrolment rates and even higher enrollment rates for girls at universities (World 
Bank, 2013). One possible explanation is that male laborers set free in the contracting sector enter 
the (formerly female labor-intensive) exporting sector, decreasing female employment in this 
expanding sector of the economy (Fischer, 2015). Another explanation is the shrinking public 
sector serving as traditional female-worker employer that increased the importance of private 
sector for women in the MENA region. Restrictions on mobility impact the choice of women, as 
do legal restrictions on women’s work and political participation, the skill mismatch that is more 
severely faced by women than by men, as does employer discrimination against women as well 
as women’s own concerns about their reputation and safety (World Bank, 2013). These 
restrictions emphasize the importance of cultural and religious factors in understanding the 
MENA context.  
Investigating the impact of individual religiosity (i.e. adherence to religious values, intensity of 
belief, and participation in religious activities) on female labor force participation, (H’madoun, 
2010) finds that there is a significant difference between religious and nonreligious women. 
Intensity of belief reduces the likelihood of employment while participation in religious activities 
increases it after controlling for individual and household characteristics. However, when country 
fixed-effects are introduced, these factors become insignificant highlighting the importance of 
country-specific institutional, economic and socio-political context. Moreover, the impact of 
religion on female labor force participation can be different across rural and urban areas. For 
example, in Malaysia, religion affects women’s labor market attachment only in rural areas 
(Amin & Alam, 2008). In Turkey, it is documented that higher urbanization leads to higher 
conservatism which negatively affects female labor force participation (Goksel, 2013).2  
Having a conservative-traditional attitude towards working women is shown to have a negative 
effect on female labor market participation in the case of Jordan’s capital Amman (Chamlou, 
Muzi, & Ahmed, 2011). It is often not clear whether it is a particular religious faith itself or the 
historically dominant cultural environment that lies below these social norms limiting women’s 
entry into labor market. Analyzing the relative importance of these two aspects of identity, Hayo 
and Caris (2013) find that Muslim women have a lower probability of working across all 
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countries while they have a higher probability of working compared to Arab women with non-
Muslim religions. This finding is attributed to the more significant role of traditional cultural 
norms than religion itself in the MENA region. It is also documented that being a religious 
individual has a more detrimental effect on attitudes towards working women than living in a 
highly religious society (Price, 2011). 
In OECD countries, the increase in female educational attainment, the expansion of service sector 
jobs and part-time employment, and the availability of childcare services are the three major 
factors that explain the rise in female labor force participation (Thévenon, 2013). Regarding the 
impact of economic and informational globalization across OECD countries, economic 
integration is found to increase the probability of women’s employment at the national level, 
while the information dimension of globalization appears to change female labor force 
participation choices rather at the regional level (Fischer, 2015). In the case of European 
countries, labor market institutions and family-oriented policies caught significant attention as 
important factors in understanding the trends in female labor force participation. In a study 
covering 15 EU countries over the last 20 years, it is found that both labor market reforms 
towards a flexicure system and expansion of family-oriented policies explain the rise in female 
labor force participation particularly among young and highly educated women. The same study 
also finds that deregulatory labor market policies are effective in increasing women’s 
employment only when supportive social policies are introduced (Cipollone, Patacchini, & 
Vallanti, 2014). The positive role of public childcare services on women’s employment is also 
documented in a study covering 24 EU countries including the new member states in Eastern 
Europe (Erhel & Guergoat-Larivière, 2013). 
Culture and particularly attitudes towards a woman’s role in the family are reported as 
statistically and economically significant factors affecting women’s employment for a panel of 
OECD countries, even after controlling for the role of policies, institutions and structural country 
characteristics (Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, & Serafinelli, 2013). Analyzing the specific role of 
religion for a cross-country analysis of 47 European countries, Pastore & Tenaglia (2013) find 
that belonging to the Orthodox, Catholic and, even more, Muslim denominations reduce the 
likelihood of employment for women while being a Protestant increases it. Interestingly, they 
find no difference between religiously active and non-active women for Orthodox and Muslim 
denominations while active women with Catholic or Protestant denominations tend to work less. 
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To the contrary, in the case of Germany, religious denomination is found to have a weak effect 
while women’s regular participation in religious activities is found to have significant negative 
effect on women’s labor force participation (Heineck, 2004). The negative effect of the strength 
of belief on women’s employment is also documented for Sweden (Maneschiold & Haraldsson, 
2007). These findings support the hypothesis that degree the degree of religiosity but not religion 
itself is important in influencing women’s labor market attachment.  
 
3. DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
This article employs the World Values Survey (WVS) (1981-2014), collection of six repeated 
cross-sections of individual-level socio-demographic information collected in 81 countries. This 
survey also includes a set of questions that relates to attitudes and values. Out of the about 
420’000 individuals those living in either MENA countries or Europe have been selected. For the 
empirical analysis, these are then matched at the country-year-level with indices of economic and 
informational globalization.  
In the following we define and describe briefly the key notions and concepts used in the 
empirical analysis. In particular, we provide a) definitions of the MENA and Europe regions, b) 
definitions of economic and information globalization, c) a definition of ‘traditional values’, that 
is socio-political conservatism, including religiosity.  
 
3.1. Definition of MENA region and Europe 
There exist various definitions of the regions ‘MENA’ and ‘Europe’ – a cultural one, a political 
one, a geographic one, and a geo-strategic one, among others. In this chapter, the geographic 
definition is employed which defines ‘Europe’ as lying on the European continent, and ‘MENA’ 
as lying in the Northern African belt and Middle-East. I regard Turkey as lying in both regions, 
while Russia is counted as European as most Russians live in the European part, not on its Asian 
part.  
Throughout this chapter, the following countries form the MENA region: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The single waves of 
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the WVS vary with respect to the countries included. Out of the 20 MENA countries, only 15 are 
covered by the WVS 1981-2014, and the following countries are missing: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The following countries are considered as lying on the continent ‘Europe’: Albania, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Herzegovina, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican state, Turkey, the United Kingdom. In the WVS 1981-2014, the 
small states Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican state as well as the large Russian-speaking 
country Belarus have never been included. 
In the course of analysis, we will not only observe whether there are differences between MENA 
countries and European countries with respect to globalization effects. It is also important to draw 
a distinction between Western Europe and Eastern Europe because of their structural and 
historical differences. The geographic distinction between ‘East’ and ‘West’ will be drawn along 
the old Austrian-Hungarian empire and the German empire; all countries lying east to these 
empires are considered ‘Eastern Europe’. The WVS includes Western European countries from 
its very start around 1981, but Eastern Europe and the MENA countries are covered only from 
the 1990s on. It was in 1990 that German unification took place, but it was in 1994 that the last 
Russian soldier left German ground, and it was in 1993 that the Czech Republic split up into two 
separate states, and it was in 1991 when Yugoslavia broke up into individual states. For this 
reason, the year 1994-1995 is chosen as the first year of the post-cold war world order. 
 
3.2. Definitions of globalization  
This chapter uses three definitions and measures of globalization: first, economic globalization 
through trade, second, globalization through international personal contacts, and third, 
information globalization through media and the internet.  
Traditionally, economists have restricted globalization to integration of the national economy into 
the global markets – through international exchange of goods and services, flows of money 
through international financial markets, and foreign investment activities in the domestic 
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economy. This study employs an index of economic globalization developed by the Technical 
University of Zurich (KOF-ETH) (see Dreher et al., 2008) that measures a country’s overall 
integration into the global economy; this index ranges from 0 to 100. The mean value of this 
index of economic globalization around 2010 is 61 points for the MENA region and 76 points for 
Europe (West: 81 points, East: 70 points) – the region MENA appears economically less 
globalized than Europe, but both regions are at very high levels of international integration.  
The remaining two measures of globalization are related to the exchange of information - either 
in the virtual space or through personal contacts. There is a historical tradition of tradesmen not 
only to import foreign goods but also to bring news about alien and exotic countries, cultures and 
new political developments. For example, the merchant Marc Polo travelled from Italy to Asia 
and became an important source of information for contemporary Europeans on the Near East 
and China. Even today we can observe that international trade with goods and merchandise is 
accompanied by the flow of information across countries, via internet, other media, travel and 
tourism, or seasonal work in foreign countries. Measured by the index of overall informational 
globalization, also made available by the KOF-ETH, the correlation between economic 
globalization and informational globalization has a coefficient of 0.61 for the MENA countries 
and one of 0.76 for Europe. For both regions, exchanging merchandise and exchanging 
information appear to go hand in hand. The mean of overall informational globalization around 
2010 is about 62 points in the MENA countries but 78 points in Europe, with 74 points reached in 
Eastern Europe and 83 points measured for Western Europe. In our empirical analysis, we 
employ the two subcomponents (each ranging from 0 to 100) of ‘information through the virtual 
space’ and ‘information through personal contacts’ separately. The first relates to information 
gained through travel, migration and tourism, while the second relates to information gained 
through media (TV, Newspapers) and the internet. Table A1 of the Appendix provides some 
descriptive statistics. 
 
3.3.  Definition of conservative-religious values 
Information on people’s values and attitudes in Europe and the MENA region and their socio-
economic conditions (gender, age, employment status, etc.) are drawn from the WVS (WVS, 
2014). The WVS was started in 1981 as an international cross-sectional survey that since then 
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collects such information roughly every five years until 2014; currently, about 420’000 persons 
from 81 countries are included. From each participating country, about 1000 persons are 
interviewed. There are about 236’000 individuals who reside in either the MENA region or 
Europe. The 20 MENA countries are represented by about 50’000 persons, of which most where 
interviewed in one of the last three waves, which is roughly from 1994 on. The WVS includes 
about 42 European countries with about 196’000 interviewees covered. Eastern Europeans have 
been included from the 3rd wave on. The empirical analysis is restricted to women only, who 
form about 50% of the interviewees. Table A1 of the Appendix provides some descriptive 
statistics. 
This analysis employs various measures of different facets of ‘conservatism’ and ‘conservative’ 
values. First of all, conservatism is defined in terms of religious values and religiosity. Second, 
conservatism is defined in terms of social and political conservatism. To illustrate, a typical 
measure of a religious value is to ‘think that god is important in one’s life’, while a typical 
measure of socio-political conservatism is to ‘consider men more suitable for political leadership 
than women’. As we can see, socio-political conservatism is mostly related to adherence to the 
traditional role model which attributes to men the role of breadwinner and to women the role of 
household workers and childcare givers. Most of these measures of conservatism are of the 
categorical type. Those measures of conservatism were selected from the pool of WVS survey 
questions that are available for a sufficient number of survey waves and countries so that at the 
macro level a panel structure emerges. The single measures of conservatism used in this study 
will be presented in more detail during the course of empirical analysis.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1.  Correlation Analysis: MENA countries 
In any empirical analysis, it is important to look at simple relationships prior to applying more 
sophisticated statistical methods. We first present some exemplary correlations between 
globalization and religious values. Female population means are calculated for the MENA 
countries based on the responses to the question about the importance of religion as exemplary 
for religious values. The following scatter plots depict the measure of globalization on the 
horizontal axis and on the vertical axis the population mean based on female respondents’ 
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answers to the question ‘how important is religion in your life’.3 Measures of globalization 
include economic globalization and informational globalization via media and the internet, and 
international personal contacts through travel and tourism. In all figures, the thin red line 
indicates the correlation between the globalization indices and the religiosity of the female 
population. These correlations are based on 27 country-year observations (based on 13 countries 
from the MENA region).  
The scatter plots show that intensifying integration into world markets is correlated with a higher 
degree of religiosity in the female population in the MENA countries, as is the better 
international connectedness through the internet and media (see Figures 1 and 2). In contrast, 
cross-country personal contacts through tourism and travel appear to be very weakly related with 
the importance of religion (not shown). The respective correlation coefficients are 0.64, 0.24 and 
0.10 for each globalization measure. Particularly economic globalization and the degree of 
religiosity show a strong correlation. Although no causal relation can be drawn from this 
analysis, globalization seems to be positively related to the degree of religiosity in those 
countries.  
An alternative dimension of religiosity is defined as one’s confidence in religious organizations 
and churches, measured on a 4-category scale, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘a great deal’. Figure 3 
presents the scatter plot for this measure of religiosity and informational globalization for 14 
MENA countries and 27 country-year observations. There is a clearly negative correlation of 
informational globalization with people’s confidence in religious organizations; the correlation 
coefficient is -0.29 (-0.06 for economic globalization and 0.02 for international personal 
contacts). 
 
17	  
	  
 
	  
Figure 1: Economic globalization and the importance of religion (MENA countries) 
 
	  
Figure 2: Informational globalization and the importance of religion (MENA countries) 
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Figure 3: Informational globalization and confidence in religious organizations (MENA countries) 
	  
	  
4.2.  Econometric Analysis 
 
4.2.1. Globalization and women’s religious values in MENA and European countries 
As next step we present results of a multivariate analysis of globalization and religiosity for 
women in the MENA region and Europe. We employ measures of religiosity and belief in 
religious values, particularly the belief in god, the importance of religion, self-reported 
religiosity, and service attendance. For this model and those to come, the regression model can be 
written in mathematical form as follows.  
yits	  =	  α	  +	  β globalizationts	  	  +	  	  Xits’	  ζ	  	  +	  	  	  FEt	  	  +	  	  FEs	  	  +	  	  εits	  	  	  	  
Using probit or ordered probit estimators, we estimate the impact of the three facets of 
globalization on these measures of women’s adherence to religious values. The regression model 
includes individual controls such as age (and age squared, age cubic) and religious denomination 
(Xit); the model also includes macro controls (FEt	  +	  FEs), particularly country fixed effects (that 
account for unobservable national characteristics such as culture and history), and year fixed 
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effects (that count for unobservable events shared by all countries in the region such as financial 
market crises). Finally, the log of the population completes the regression model; it accounts for 
the fact that smaller countries are more likely to be globalized, while large countries are, in 
tendency, more self-sufficient, autonomous and less internationally connected. 
An issue of concern might be reversed causality; there is, however, little real-life evidence for the 
MENA region or Europe that religious attitudes in the population affected the degree of a 
country’s economic and social openness. The decision to open up a country has in most cases 
been made by the political elite, as exemplified in many developing countries and in the 
formation of EU. 
Table 1. Globalization and religious values and religiosity in MENA countries 
MENA region (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Religion 
important in life 
God 
important in life 
Religious 
person 
Attendance of 
service 
Log (economic glob.) 2.325** 8.361** 1.141** 31.059** 
 
(7.71) (23.19) (32.61) (21.27) 
Log (pers. contacts) -1.252* 44.244** -13.056** 42.091** 
 
(3.15) (6.93) (38.39) (20.47) 
Log (inf. flow) -0.702** -51.836** 7.757** 18.643** 
 
(4.98) (6.91) (22.28) (30.22) 
Estimation method Ordered probit Ordered probit Probit Ordered probit 
Observations 21’245 20’585 18’962 19’066 
Countries 13 14 13 12 
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.077 0.132 0.067 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), a dichotomous index of Muslim denomination, 
population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 1 presents the regression results for the impact of economic globalization and globalization 
of information on four measures of religiosity and adherence to religious values of women in the 
MENA countries. We observe that the different dimensions of globalization exert differential 
(non-homogenous) effects: Economic globalization – a country’s integration into global markets 
– increases women’s likelihood of adherence to religious values and religiosity: the more a 
MENA country opens up to international trade, the higher the probability for its female residents 
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to find religion or god important in their lives, the more likely that they regard themselves as 
religious persons, and the more likely that they attend service in mosques or churches.4 The 
estimation results for international personal contacts through travel and work and information 
globalization through the internet and media are mixed and difficult to interpret. Our reading is 
that international personal contacts and work experience foster religious beliefs (self-report 
importance of god, service attendance) while media and global communication rather weaken 
them (importance of religion or god in life). 
Table 2. Globalization and religious values and religiosity in Europe 
Region: Western Europe (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Religion  
important in life 
God  
important in life 
Religious  
person 
Attendance of  
Service 
Log (economic glob.) 0.036 0.191** -0.037 0.045 
 
(0.16) (2.71) (0.23) (0.51) 
Log (pers. contacts) 0.596 -0.274 -0.388 0.388 
 
(0.78) (0.64) (0.64) (0.79) 
Log (inf. flow) -0.124 -0.180 -0.088 -0.586*** 
 
(0.41) (0.84) (0.25) (4.65) 
Estimation method Ordered probit Ordered probit Probit Ordered probit 
Observations 30610 36495 34793 36172 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.08 0.202 0.103 
     Region: Eastern Europe  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (economic glob.) 0.291+ 0.178+ 0.053 0.438*** 
 
(2.37) (2.10) (0.37) (4.04) 
Log (pers. contacts) -0.171 0.092 0.057 0.821+ 
 
(0.63) (0.33) (0.15) (2.52) 
Log (inf. flow) -0.159 -0.195 -0.719** -0.261 
 
(1.07) (1.34) (3.19) (1.11) 
Estimation method Ordered probit Ordered probit Probit Ordered probit 
Observations 30’252 29’796 28’844 30’441 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.112 0.243 0.112 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, 
and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Overall these findings of Table 1 can be interpreted as follows. Economic globalization 
transforms the economy and society so violently that people seek guidance and support from their 
religious leaders and value systems. Similarly, personal contacts with people from alien cultures 
let women from MENA countries find and re-enforce their local cultural identity in religious 
(club) activities like attending service. On the other hand, critical information through the global 
media put one’s own value system into question - letting women from MENA countries raise 
critical questions about their religious values and institutions.   
For European countries, the estimation results of the same analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Because of the different histories between Eastern and Western Europe (post-communist, long-
time isolated countries versus traditional democratic and open OECD countries), the country 
sample is split into two groups ‘Eastern Europe’ and ‘Western Europe’, defined by geographic 
location.  
It appears that in Western Europe globalization has no impact on religious values whatsoever, 
with two exceptions: first, service attendance, which declines in cross-national media 
communication, and second, the importance of god, which increases in economic integration. For 
Eastern Europe, with a weak statistical significance at the 10 percent level, economic 
globalization appears to increase female residents’ religious values and beliefs – this is a parallel 
development to that observed in the MENA region (see Table 1). In both Western and Eastern 
Europe, modern communication and information exchange has the tendency of lowering 
women’s adherence to religious values and participation in religious activities (the coefficient 
signs are all negative throughout). However, in contrast to the MENA region, there is neither a 
fostering nor a lowering effect of information globalization through personal contacts, travel and 
work.  
One may argue that in Western Europe the vast changes in countries’ openness occurred prior to 
1994, that is during the post-WW II period, while little changes in globalization are observable 
from the 1990s on. Indeed, e.g. France experienced from 1980 to 1995 an increase in economic 
openness by 30% (48 points to 63 points) , while there were little changes between 1995 and 
2010 (69 points) (see also the discussion in Fischer & Somogyi, 2012). In addition, the WVS 
does not provide observations that pertain to Eastern Europe and the MENA region prior to the 
1990s. For that reason, Table 3 analyses globalization effects for religious values in Western 
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Europe during two time periods: prior to 1994, and after 1994. Table 3 reveals that the decisive 
effects of globalization in Western Europe occurred all prior to 1994, during the cold war period. 
In tendency, the importance of religious values declines in economic openness, while the 
attendance-of-service decreasing effect of both economic and informational globalization appears 
particularly strong. 
 
Table 3. Western Europe during Cold War era and after 
year >= 1995 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Religion  
important in life 
God  
important in life 
Religious  
Person 
Attendance of  
Service 
Log (economic glob.) 1.058+ 0.602 0.319 0.678 
 
(2.44) (1.54) (0.90) (1.61) 
Log (pers. contacts) 0.739 1.589 -0.117 1.819 
 
(0.52) (1.05) (0.09) (1.11) 
Log (inf. flow) -0.159 -0.752 0.307 -1.138 
 
(0.15) (0.75) (0.31) (1.14) 
Estimation method Ordered probit Ordered probit Probit Ordered probit 
Observations 204’32 20’689 19’792 20’077 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.085 0.205 0.098 
     year < 1995 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (economic glob.) -4.756+ 0.303* -0.073 -0.272** 
 
(2.41) (3.19) (0.27) (3.94) 
Log (pers. contacts) -40.646* -0.405 -1.406 0.638 
 
(2.66) (0.52) (1.02) (0.73) 
Log (inf. flow) 24.403* -1.196* 0.042 -1.288* 
 
(2.60) (2.83) (0.04) (3.09) 
Estimation method Ordered probit Ordered probit Probit Ordered probit 
Observations 10’178 15’806 15’001 16’095 
Countries 17 17 17 17 
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.075 0.194 0.106 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, 
and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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4.2.2.  Globalization and organizations of religion 
Religious values can be followed and religiosity can be lived in private space and in institutional 
space such as mosques and churches equally. Hence the question arises whether or not the 
development we have observed for religious values and religiosity are similar for the institutions 
and organizations that claim to teach and safeguard those values. Specifically, we look at two 
measures: first, people’s reported confidence in religious organizations, and second, their 
membership in such organizations. Confidence in religious organizations is measured on a 4-
point scale, based on the question ‘how much confidence do you have in them?’5 Table 4 reports 
the empirical results for confidence in religion and Table 5 for membership in religious 
organizations. 
 
Table 4. Globalization and confidence in religious organizations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Region MENA Europe Western  E. Eastern E. 
Western E.,  
< 1995 
Western E.,  
> 1994 
Log (economic 
glob.) 2.435** 0.095 0.237+ 0.005 0.510** -0.120 
 
(10.93) (0.88) (1.96) (0.04) (4.98) (0.26) 
Log (pers. contacts) 36.435** -0.085 0.043 -0.046 0.510 2.927 
 
(9.95) (0.20) (0.07) (0.09) (0.76) (1.87) 
Log (inf. flow) -45.005** -0.715** -0.950* -0.460+ -2.420** -2.609* 
 
(10.54) (4.91) (2.93) (2.54) (4.98) (2.69) 
Estimation method 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Observations 19’004 65’503 35’471 30’032 15’473 19’998 
Countries 13 41 21 20 16 21 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.096 0.097 0.077 0.101 0.097 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of 
Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
The most striking finding is that exposure to international flows of information through the 
internet and media make people more critical toward churches and other religious organizations. 
This development is observable in both the MENA region, and Eastern and Western Europe. In 
Western Europe, this influence of informational globalization is stronger during the Cold War 
24	  
	  
period. Only observable in the MENA region, cross-national personal contacts increase people’s 
confidence in their religious institutions and organizations.  
In contrast, international trade exerts the opposite effect: it raises people’s confidence in religious 
organizations - this is observable both in the MENA region, and in Western Europe prior to 1995 
(columns 1 and 5). For the remaining regions and time periods, economic globalization shows no 
effect. Obviously, with respect to economic globalization and informational globalization, the 
development of the MENA region since the 90ies is somewhat in parallel to the development in 
Western Europe prior to 1995, as a comparison of columns 1 and 5 of Table 4 reveals.  
Another facet of religious organizations is membership in them. The WVS provides information 
on ‘membership’ in religious organizations; membership includes both active and passive 
memberships. In Europe, there is a financial incentive to cease the official membership in 
religious organizations for tax saving reasons. On the other hand, in Europe, churches run 
hospitals and kindergartens and other social enterprises, co-financed by the government.  
 
Table 5. Globalization and membership in religious organizations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Region MENA Europe Western E. Eastern E. 
Western E.,  
< 1995 
Western E.,  
> 1994 
Log (economic glob.) 0.383 0.747* 0.949+ -0.151 -0.044 5.936** 
 
(0.58) (2.97) (2.42) (0.99) (0.11) (4.98) 
Log (pers. contacts) 1.219 0.182 1.108 -0.529 3.703 -7.281 
 
(0.44) (0.47) (0.99) (1.17) (1.67) (1.40) 
Log (inf. flow) -1.151 -1.197* -2.326* -0.452+ -1.416 0.537 
 
(0.80) (3.16) (2.87) (2.21) (0.89) (0.24) 
Estimation method Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  
Observations 13’155 65’298 36’792 28’506 16’206 20’582 
Countries 12 41 21 20 17 21 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.191 0.188 0.159 0.102 0.229 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of 
Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 reports the results for the impact of globalization on the probability of being a member in 
religious organizations. In the MENA region, we do not observe any changes triggered by 
economic or informational globalization. In Europe, membership probability increases with 
international trade but decreases with greater exposure to the worldwide flow of information – a 
finding mostly driven by the pre-1995 era in Western Europe.  
 
Table 6. Globalization and active and inactive memberships in religious organizations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Passive member Active member 
Region MENA Europe MENA Europe 
Log (economic glob.) -2.249** 0.067 1.232** -0.521 
 
(5.20) (0.21) (12.76) (1.16) 
Log (pers. contacts) -13.812** 0.066 -0.857** -0.364 
 
(20.49) (0.06) (5.80) (0.31) 
Log (inf. flow) 26.508** -1.901** -2.553** -1.027 
 
(15.09) (3.86) (6.95) (1.86) 
Estimation method Multinomial Logit; base category: no membership 
Observations 11’519 29’534 
  Countries 12 32 
  Pseudo R2 0.177 0.203 
  Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of
Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
We can differentiate between active and passive membership for only some waves of the WVS. 
These few observations permit only an analysis for the MENA region and Europe; most of the 
observations are from either the mid-nineties (1994-1997) and from 2000 or later. Table 6 
presents multinomial logit estimation results in which non-membership serves as the reference 
outcome or base category.  
Table 6 gives us differentiated results for active and passive memberships particularly for the 
MENA region, while globalization affects membership only little in European countries. For 
MENA countries, it appears that international trade causes a polarization in the female 
population: In response to intensified international trade, women in the MENA region either drop 
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out of religious organizations or they become more active, more religious members. While 
international personal contacts decrease the probability of active or passive memberships likewise 
(over being a non-member), the international flow of information appears, again, to make women 
more critical towards active engagement in religious organizations, decreasing the probability of 
active memberships. For Europe, in contrast, we observe only that information globalization lets 
inactive members become non-members of religious organizations, thus not affecting those who 
are actively engaged in their churches. 
 
Summary for religious values 
Overall, confidence in religious institutions is affected the same way as is adherence to religious 
values: economic globalization causes people to revert to religion as institution and to its specific 
value system, while globalization of information decreases people’s confidence in such 
institutions and values. This development is observable in both the MENA region and Europe, 
particularly Western Europe prior to 1995. For the MENA region, cross-national personal 
contacts appear to foster religious values.   
 
4.2.3.  Globalization and secular conservative values 
Historically, religious values gave rise to political and social conservatism restricting women’s 
access to the labor market, while ‘progressive’ political parties rejected religious institutions and 
the role they played in preserving the traditional role model. Nowadays, however, this clear 
distinction between conservative-religious and progressive-atheist attitudes has been blurred: e.g., 
today it is not uncommon to be religious and to share progressive views at the same time. 
Therefore it is necessary to analyze conservative secular values separately from religious values 
when discussing the societal effects of economic and informational globalization. Conservative 
socio-political values and attitudes are defined as adherence to the patriarchic family structure, 
which supports the traditional role model, assigning women the role of household worker and 
childcare giver and men the role of household head and breadwinner; this view affects fertility 
decisions, the distribution of resources among family members and the desirability of the state of 
marriage for a woman.  
27	  
	  
To measure women’s social and political conservatism, the following survey questions of the 
WVS are employed: The question about the importance of family in respondent’s life, measured 
in 4 categories from (1) “not important at all” to (4) “very important”; the question on whether 
university education should be more for boys than for girls, and the question on whether men are 
better political leaders than women, with answers to both questions measured on a 4-point scale, 
ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) “agree strongly”. We also employ three questions on 
whether the respondents believe that certain actions are justifiable: divorce, abortion, or suicide. 
The survey question ‘please tell me whether the following action can always be justified, never 
be justified, or something in between:…’ allows answers on a 10-point scale, with (after 
recoding) the highest value given to the most conservative attitude, that is viewing divorce, 
abortion, etc. as never justifiable. The empirical analysis applies regression model (1) 
accordingly. 
In line with this traditional-conservative attitude is possibly that family is viewed as an important 
institution in society, that parental educational investment in boys should be larger than that in 
girls, and that politics is the sphere of men rather than women. In addition, we believe that 
conservative women are most likely to reject abortion (as this constitutes a rejection of the role of 
motherhood) and to be against divorce (as divorce is regarded as threat to the institution 
‘family’). In addition, also suicide should not be justifiable, rejecting the divine gift of life and 
therefore constituting a ‘sin’ in all monotheistic religions.  
Table 7 shows how globalization impacts conservative secular values of women in MENA 
countries. Economic integration has a decisive impact on the erosion of conservative values that 
relate directly to female labor market participation (columns 1 and 2): with increased economic 
globalization, women in MENA countries have a higher probability to report that family is less 
important, and that boys should not be preferred when it comes to university education (and also 
that divorce can be justified, at the 10 percent level). While these two conservative values are 
considerably weakened by economic globalization, the remaining conservative attitudes appear to 
be fostered: women in MENA countries are more likely to believe that men form better political 
leaders, and that abortion and suicide are never justified. 
Informational globalization appears to trigger some critical distance toward conservative values, 
particularly toward those not pertaining to labor market participation (divorce, abortion, suicide); 
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in contrast, international personal contacts foster those conservative values (columns 3 through 
6). Values pertaining to labor market participation are not affected at all by any type of 
worldwide information sharing (columns 1 and 2).  
 
Table 7. Globalization and conservative values in MENA countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Family 
important in 
life 
University 
more for boys 
than girls 
Men better  
political 
leaders 
Divorce  
never justified 
Abortion 
never justified 
Suicide never 
justified 
Log 
(economic 
glob.) -1.539** -2.481** 2.696** -0.532+ 0.893** 4.633** 
 
(7.63) (14.19) (20.36) (2.47) (6.78) (25.73) 
Log (pers. 
contacts) 4.771 -4.363 5.402* 32.027** 55.528** 66.792** 
 
(1.28) (1.34) (3.03) (8.93) (23.67) (20.95) 
Log (inf. 
flow) -6.163 0.818 -9.553** -33.306** -58.841** -72.941** 
 
(1.44) (0.22) (4.62) (8.02) (21.51) (19.89) 
Estimation 
method 
Ordered 
probit  
Ordered 
probit  
Ordered 
probit  
Ordered 
probit  
Ordered 
probit  
Ordered 
probit  
Obs. 21’275 19’808 19’370 19’201 16’580 14’810 
Countries 13 13 13 14 14 13 
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.021 0.061 0.048 0.050 0.069 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), a dichotomous index of Muslim denomination, 
population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8 reports the results for Eastern Europe, for which we have observations from 1992 on. In 
general, there are only a few incidences where facets of globalization appear to affect women’s 
conservative values: international trade increases women’s likelihood to accept divorce as 
justifiable, international personal contacts lead women to treat boys and girls more unequally 
when it comes to university education. In contrast, cross-national communication and information 
flows tend to make Eastern European women less conservative with respect to almost all secular 
conservative values tested. 
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Table 8.  Globalization and conservative values in Eastern Europe 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Family 
important in 
life 
University more 
for boys than girls 
Men better 
political 
leaders 
Divorce 
never 
justifiable 
Abortion 
never 
justifiable 
Suicide 
never 
justifiable 
Log 
(economic 
glob.) 0.164 0.160 -0.174 -0.278* -0.101 0.245 
 
(0.97) (1.22) (1.68) (2.89) (0.81) (0.84) 
Log (pers. 
contacts) -0.092 0.977** 0.608 -0.139 0.387 0.896 
 
(0.20) (11.12) (1.55) (0.50) (1.40) (1.30) 
Log (inf. 
flow) -0.177 -0.455* 0.165+ -0.368** -0.224+ -0.505 
 
(1.41) (2.82) (1.98) (3.66) (2.29) (1.19) 
Estimation 
method 
Ordered 
probit Ordered probit Ordered probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Observatio
ns 31’088 22’322 21’746 27’852 27’746 27’669 
Countries 20 18 18 20 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.046 0.047 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, 
and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 9 presents the more interesting case of women in Western Europe. As before, the results 
are presented for both the full sample from 1981 to 2014, and the two sub-samples pre-1995 and 
post-1995. Certain measures of political and social conservatism (‘men make better political 
leaders’, ‘university education better for boys than for boys’) were not recorded for a sufficient 
number of countries so that they had to be excluded from the analysis. The results for the full 
sample of Western Europe are reported in columns 1-4, while the results for the pre-1995 period 
are reported in columns 6-8 below, and those for the post-1995 period are reported in columns 9-
12.  
Looking at Western Europe in its entire period 1981 through 2014, there is no impact of any facet 
of globalization on secular conservative values - this picture changes when we allow for the 
impact of globalization to differ between pre-1995 and post-1994 phases. It appears that during 
the cold war era values pertaining to the labor market were altered, while the remaining 
conservative values appear strongly affected after 1995. During the Cold War era, economic 
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globalization but also international personal contacts decrease women’s adherence to those 
conservative values that directly pertained to labor market participation (importance of family). 
In the post-Cold War era instead, economic globalization negatively affects all other measures of 
conservatism (divorce, suicide, abortion) in this analysis. We can conclude that economic 
globalization influences, as a first step, women’s view on her family, directly affecting her 
employment decisions, and then, decades later, the whole spectrum of conservative secular values 
that affect any decision. In general, the information flow through the internet appears equally 
destructive to female adherence to conservative secular values, while cross-national personal 
contacts appear to play little role.  
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Table 9. Globalization and conservative values in Western Europe 
 
Importance of 
family 
Divorce never 
justifiable 
Abortion never 
justifiable 
Suicide never 
justifiable 
Full sample (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (econ. glob.) 0.099 -0.041 -0.239 -0.297 
 
(0.51) (0.28) (1.48) (1.35) 
Log (pers. contacts) -0.150 1.495+ 2.066+ -0.082 
 
(0.17) (2.27) (2.34) (0.09) 
Log (inf. flow) 0.298 0.013 0.217 -0.242 
 
(1.07) (0.03) (0.66) (0.42) 
Estimation method Ordered probit  Ordered probit  Ordered probit  Ordered probit  
Observations 30’897 36’303 35’843 35’095 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.037 0.051 0.062 
     Time: < 1995 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (econ. glob.) -7.803** 0.306 0.012 0.336 
 
(9.32) (1.25) (0.04) (1.58) 
Log (pers. contacts) -14.583** -1.279 -0.264 -1.890 
 
(9.46) (0.81) (0.15) (1.66) 
Log (inf. flow) 11.153** -1.172 -3.114** 1.244 
 
(10.83) (1.32) (3.35) (1.74) 
Observations 10’278 15’738 15’389 15’376 
Countries 17 17 17 17 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.028 0.045 0.035 
     Time: > 1994 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log (econ. glob.) 1.104 -1.938** -0.544 -3.622** 
 
(2.02) (3.50) (1.16) (5.88) 
Log (pers. contacts) -2.037 5.938** 2.207 -1.434 
 
(1.51) (3.29) (1.27) (0.87) 
Log (inf. flow) 0.558 -0.834 0.755 1.178 
 
(0.82) (0.91) (0.88) (1.50) 
Observations 20’619 20’565 20’454 19’719 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.033 0.050 0.093 
Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, 
and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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4.2.4.  Conservatism and female labor market participation 
 
Religious values, religiosity and female employment 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, we have investigated how globalization affects female 
conservatism – that is religious or secular conservatism. But do these values affect women’s 
behavior, in particular their labor market participation? This section addresses this question. The 
WVS data provides also information on respondent’s labor market status (besides age, gender, 
religion, the country of residence and survey year). The labor market status allows for the 
following categories: fully employed, half-time employed, self-employed, unemployed, but also 
housewife, disabled (other), student/apprentice, and retired. In the conventional definition of 
labor market participation, an ‘active’ person is defined as either ‘employed’ or ‘officially 
recorded unemployed’. Many developing and transition countries as well as Southern European 
countries, however, do not have well-developed welfare state institutions of unemployment 
benefits that cover a long time period. Hence the group of persons actively seeking a job but 
reporting in any other group of employment status might have a significant share. For this reason, 
we use a definition of ‘unemployed’ including any other non-employment status such as 
‘unemployed’, ‘housewife’, ‘other’ and ‘early retired’, excluding ‘students’. As in the part on 
globalization and religious and conservative values, the analysis is restricted to women between 
the ages of 18 and 60. We apply regression model (1) accordingly; for computational ease 
estimations are carried out with Logit.  
Table 10 reveals that in the MENA countries women who adhere to religious values are less 
likely to be working, as expected (columns 1 through 4): The more women state that religion or 
god is important to them in their lives, the less likely they are reported as ‘employed’ in the 
survey. The same is observed for women who have stronger confidence in religious 
organizations. For self-report religious women, we observe the same tendency (significant at the 
10 percent level). Table 10 also shows analogous findings for both Eastern and Western Europe 
equally (columns 5 through 12). With respect to how religious values affect employment 
decisions, women in MENA countries react like women in Western and Eastern Europe, 
irrespective of their denomination.  
33	  
	  
Table 10. Religious values and female employment in MENA countries and Europe 
Determinant of 
interest Religious person 
Religion is important 
in life 
God is important in 
life 
Confidence in  
religious 
organizations 
Region: MENA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Religious -0.459+ -0.471** -0.137** -0.282** 
 
(2.14) (4.34) (4.00) (5.24) 
Estimation method Logit  Logit Logit  Logit 
Observations 18’232 20’487 19’840 18’278 
Countries 13 13 14 13 
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.183 0.191 0.190 
     Region: Western 
Europe (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
-0.181** -0.170** -0.052** -0.143** 
 
(3.32) (5.82) (6.56) (4.00) 
Estimation method Logit  Logit Logit  Logit 
Observations 35’653 31’600 37’031 36’406 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.095 0.097 0.100 
     Region: Eastern 
Europe (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
-0.371* -0.201** -0.068** -0.188** 
 
(2.78) (3.57) (4.37) (4.74) 
Estimation method Logit  Logit Logit  Logit 
Observations 30’368 32’043 30’688 32’008 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.176 0.169 0.177 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also 
of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. The categorical measures of religious values and religiosity are treated as continuous in the regression; 
treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings (see Table A2 and A3 of the Appendix). 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Did the impact of religious values on female employment change over time? Only for Western 
Europe we can answer this question as the WVS surveys date back to 1981, while for the MENA 
countries and Eastern Europe survey data are available only from the mid-90s on. Table 11 
compares Western Europe across two periods: the Cold War era 1981-1994 and the post-Cold 
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War era 1995-2014. We observe that the employment-lowering impact of religious values on 
women in Western Europe has been stable over the last 30 years.  
 
Table 11. Religious values and female employment in Western Europe, during the Cold War era 
and after 
Determinant of interest Religious person 
Religion  
is important in life God is important in life 
Confidence in  
religious organizations 
West, < 1995 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
-0.215+ -0.040** -0.061** -0.182** 
 
(2.22) (5.37) (6.99) (4.46) 
Estimation method Logit 
OLS 
Logit not concave Logit Logit 
Observations 15’985 11’312 16’473 16’538 
Countries 18 18 18 17 
Pseudo R2 0.124 - 0.121 0.128 
     West, > 1994 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
-0.152** -0.153** -0.044** -0.102* 
 
(4.67) (5.34) (4.94) (2.82) 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Observations 19’668 20’288 20’558 19’868 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.085 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, 
Catholic, and Orthodox denominations. All models include population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and 
country fixed effects. The categorical measures of religious values and religiosity are treated as continuous in the 
regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings (see Table A3 of the Appendix). 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
Membership in religious organizations and female employment 
We have already discussed that personal adherence to religious values and formal membership in 
religious organizations might be the two distinct facets of ‘religiosity’ - a difference that might 
then manifest in differing impacts on labor market behavior. Indeed, looking at female 
employment in the MENA region and Europe, Table 12 reveals that official membership in 
religious groups does not decisively affect women’s employment, nor does attendance of service. 
Only those women in Europe who attend service once a week or more (or who are self-report 
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active in Eastern Europe) appear to be also religious persons in the sense of adhering to certain 
traditional values.6 
 
Table 12. Affiliation in religious organization and female employment 
 
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Region MENA MENA Western Europe 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Determinant of interest        
Member religious group -0.070 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.099+ 
  
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(2.11) 
  Passive member 
     
0.015 
 
      
(0.25) 
 Active member 
     
-0.231+ 
 
      
(2.22) 
 Never, practically never  .  .   . 
(reference group)        
Less often 
 
0.037 
 
0.028 
  
0.118 
  
(0.36) 
 
(0.55) 
  
(1.05) 
Once a year 
 
0.076 
 
0.094 
  
0.100 
  
(1.08) 
 
(1.55) 
  
(1.08) 
Only on special holy 
days 
 
-0.130 
 
0.032 
  
-0.031 
  
(0.93) 
 
(0.53) 
  
(0.24) 
Once a month 
 
0.046 
 
-0.039 
  
-0.061 
  
(0.34) 
 
(0.47) 
  
(0.47) 
Once a week 
 
0.051 
 
-0.268* 
  
-0.230+ 
  
(1.03) 
 
(3.28) 
  
(2.13) 
More than once a week 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.487** 
  
-0.537** 
  
(0.59) 
 
(4.23) 
  
(4.57) 
Estimation method Logit	   Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Observations 12’561 18’893 37’327 37’108 30’342 17’461 31’438 
Countries 12 12 21 21 20 18 20 
Pseudo R2 0.226 0.154 0.095 0.099 0.157 0.155 0.171 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also 
of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. Reference categories are: non-members in religious groups, attendance of service: (1) never. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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In general, membership in a relious group and active engagement in its group activities does not 
appear to impact employment of women in the same way as was observable for self-reported 
adherence to certain religious principles and values (Tables 10 and 11). This difference in labor 
market behavior between membership and religious values is apparent for the MENA region and 
Europe equally. 
 
Conservative social and political values and employment of women 
Whether or not adherence to conservative secular values has the expected (negative) impact on 
female employment in the regions under analysis is investigated in Table 13. To approximate a 
conservative attitude, the same set of variables is used as in the first part of the empirical analysis 
on globalization (Tables 7 through 9): the importance of family, the question of university 
education for girls, the view on men as better political leaders, and the questions concerning the 
justifiability of divorce, suicide, and abortion.  
Table 13 reveals that, in general, women who adhere to these secular conservative values and 
attitudes are less likely to be in gainful employment: women who state that university education 
is more for boys than for girls, women who state that men are better political leaders, and women 
who think that divorce or abortion are never justified are less likely to be in a paid position. This 
general observation holds true for the MENA region and Eastern and Western Europe likewise. 
We also observe in both regions that the importance of family works as a somewhat weaker 
restriction to female labor market participation (significances at the 10 percent levels), and the 
justifiability of suicide in case of the MENA countries. Overall, our prediction that conservative 
secular values impose a restriction on female labor market participation is fully confirmed.   
Finally, Tables 14 analyses whether the effect of conservative socio-political values have 
restricted female labor market participation not only recently but also longer in the past. For 
Western Europe, answers recorded prior to 1994 are available to the questions on justifiability of 
divorce, abortion, or suicide. The empirical analysis reveals that conservative secular values are 
in opposition to women’s employment for a longer time by now (pre-1995 as well as post-1994), 
yielding a stable effect over the last 30 years.   
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Table 13. Conservatism and female employment in MENA region and Europe 
Determinant of 
interest 
Importance 
of family 
University 
more for 
boys than 
girls 
Men better 
political 
leaders 
Divorce is 
never 
justifiable 
Abortion is 
never 
justifiable 
Suicide is 
never 
justifiable 
Region: MENA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
-0.094 -0.207** -0.203** -0.066** -0.085** -0.024 
 
(0.91) (3.52) (4.35) (4.05) (3.51) (1.42) 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Observations 20’516 19’072 18’641 18’465 15’846 14’109 
Countries 13 13 13 14 14 13 
Pseudo R2 0.176 0.184 0.184 0.208 0.212 0.211 
       Region: Eastern 
Europe (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
-0.109+ -0.200** -0.161** -0.059** -0.037** -0.023** 
 
(2.40) (3.73) (4.27) (6.15) (3.41) (3.99) 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Observations 33’095 20’876 20’326 29’828 29’731 29’354 
Countries 20 18 18 20 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.160 0.159 0.166 0.164 0.162 
       
Region: Western 
Europe (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 -0.158+ -0.182** -0.132** -0.072** -0.074** -0.050** 
 (2.44) (7.76) (3.47) (12.97) (10.13) (6.45) 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Observations 31’898 11’176 10’849 37’233 36’775 35’637 
Countries 21 14 14 21 21  21 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.101 0.098 
       
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also 
of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. The categorical measures of conservative values are treated as continuous in the regression; treating 
them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, 
** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
38	  
	  
Table 14. Conservatism and female employment in Western Europe, 1981-1994 and 1995-2014 
 
Importance of 
family 
University 
more for 
boys than 
girls 
Men better 
political 
leaders 
Divorce is 
never 
justifiable 
Abortion is 
never 
justifiable 
Suicide is 
never 
justifiable 
Western 
Europe (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
> 1994 -0.124 -0.182** -0.132** -0.062** -0.073** -0.048** 
 
(1.62) (7.76) (3.47) (11.26) (8.08) (5.41) 
Estimation 
method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Obs. 20475 11176 10849 20433 20324 19590 
Countries 21 14 14 21 21 21 
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.102 0.101 0.086 0.089 0.085 
       Western 
Europe (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
<  1995 
   
-0.081** -0.076** -0.046** 
    
(8.57) (8.66) (4.49) 
Estimation 
method 
No 
convergence 
  
Logit Logit Logit 
Obs. 
 
No obs. No obs. 16800 16451 16047 
Countries 
   
18 18 18 
Pseudo R2 
   
0.127 0.126 0.121 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, 
Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The 
categorical measures of conservative values are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical 
does not qualitatively alter the findings. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The importance of gainful ‘work’ for human happiness and individual’s self-esteem has 
undergone a profound societal change: until the 19th century having to work for one’s living was 
considered a bare necessity for survival; the nobility, wealthy people and ‘honorable’ women of 
the higher classes spent their time on leisure time activities and politics only. Goldin (2006) 
reports for 1920ies and 1930ies in the USA that even then working women were considered a 
poor-class phenomenon where husbands’ wage was not sufficiently high to sustain their families; 
also in Western Europe until the 1960ies it was common for women to terminate their work 
contracts the day the got married and started a family. This gendered division of labor in society 
was supported by the traditional role model that, as social norm, attributes to women household 
and care work and to men the role of sole breadwinner. 
Today, in most developed and many developing countries, having gainful ‘work’ has become an 
important determinant of experienced utility, identity and self-esteem for both men and women 
alike (Bjørnskov, Dreher & Fischer, 2007). Sen (1999) argues that we view now income not only 
as a resource for consumption but also as means to social and political participation. This implies 
for women that earning their own income independently from men’s allows them to participate in 
society as full members with equal rights. However, despite considerable improvements over 
time, labor markets continue to be characterized by gender disparity: specifically, sexually 
segregated jobs, large earning differentials between men and women, and a double-burden for 
women of both household work and gainful work (Elson & Cagatay, 2000) – all indicating the 
persistence of the traditional role model. However, gender roles assigned to men and women are 
socially constructed and contingent on cultural norms and, possibly, depend on the level of 
economic development and openness of the national economy (Fernandez, 2013). It is only 
recently that ordinary people started to question and revise these traditional-conservative  
attitudes.7  
This chapter poses the question whether globalization of markets and society changes women’s 
attitudes towards their secular and religious conservatism, and, ultimately, their labor market 
participation. Using an international survey on about 420’000 people in more than 80 countries 
from 1981 to 2014 that is matched with measures of economic and informational globalization at 
the country level, this study investigates this question comparing the predominantly Muslim 
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MENA region with the predominantly Christian Europe. Conservative values are measured as, 
first, one’s degree of religiosity and adherence to religious values, and, second, one’s degree of 
secular conservatism that is reflected in specific views on, e.g., abortion, divorce, and education 
of girls. Globalization is defined in three ways: first, economic globalization through flows of 
goods, services, and financial resources, second, informational globalization through internet and 
media, and, third, increased personal contacts through travel and tourism. 
Adherence to religious values and religiosity gains in strength as economic globalization 
intensifies in the MENA region. Also international personal contracts seem to foster the religious 
belief of women in this region; in contrast, access to global media and communication rather 
weaken them. While these findings are not conclusive for Western Europe, a similar effect is 
observed for Eastern Europe. In all three regions, however, exposure to the international flow of 
information through the internet and media makes people more critical toward religious 
organizations. Possibly, reverting to religious values and organization as economic globalization 
transforms society and economy constitutes a form of psychic and social self-protection.  
Secular conservative values and attitudes in the MENA region are eroded by economic 
globalization if they pertain to female labor market participation (i.e. the role of family and girls’ 
education) while the remaining conservative attitudes appear to be fostered. In Western Europe 
we observe a similar outlook: pre-1995 only secular conservative values restricting gainful 
employment are eroded by economic integration, while after 1995 all other secular conservative 
values are equally negatively affected. Eastern Europe appears to be on a different path of 
development. Based on these findings, we can conclude that the development Western Europe 
undergoes from 1995 on, the erosion of all secular-conservative values on a broad scale, is a 
prediction of what will happen in the MENA region in the coming decades. 
Female labor force participation is negatively affected by adherence to religious values in both 
the MENA region and Eastern and Western Europe likewise. It is also seen that this negative 
effect has been observed in Western Europe throughout the last 30 years, in our study between 
1980 and 2014. When we look at the impact of secular conservative values and attitudes, the 
same negative and persistent effect on female labor market attachment is documented for all three 
regions under analysis.  
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There are seemingly many similarities between women in the MENA region and those in 
Western Europe: both respond to increased globalization of information with a more critical 
distance toward religious values and conservative attitudes – independent of their religious 
denomination. Women in both regions also show the same behavior toward employment: the 
more secular-conservative or religious they are, the less likely they participate in the labor 
market. It also appears that women adapt their preferences to a changing economic environment, 
caused by the transforming forces of economic globalization; those secular conservative values 
constituting an (internal) restriction to labor market participation appear to fall apart first - this 
development is observable in both Western Europe prior to 1995 and in the MENA region 
nowadays. In Western Europe, the remaining secular values follow this pattern later, serving as 
prediction of what might happen in the MENA countries in the future. 
Major policy implications of this study are that labor force participation of women can be 
promoted through both economic globalization and through increased access to internet and 
global media. First, through increased international integration of the country into global markets, 
economic globalization appears to change women’s attitude toward the desirability of becoming 
employed; second, through increased access to global media and internet, informational 
globalization appears to weaken adherence to the traditional role model and conservative-secular 
and religious values.  
 
 
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Globalization: increased economic, political, social and cultural integration of countries into the 
world 
Female labor force participation: female population share that is employed or actively seeking 
a job. 
Identity: person’s sense of self 
Religiosity: adherence to religious values and belief systems 
Conservative values: adherence to the traditional role model which assigns to men the role of 
breadwinner and to women the role of household workers and childcare givers 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Region: MENA 
Economic globalization 17’310 49.49 15.41 16.95 81.25 
Informational globalization 17’310 65.49 10.29 30.22 84.84 
Cross-national personal contacts 17’310 39.05 18.51 25.02 86.13 
Age 22’258 35.51 10.8815 18 60 
Muslim 22’258 .62 .49 0 1 
Orthodox 22’258 .003 .06 0 1 
Protestant 22’258 .02 .15 0 1 
Catholic 22’258 .007 .08 0 1 
 
Region: Western Europe 
Economic globalization 35’982 62.96 19.83 22.53 99.52 
Informational globalization 35’982 73.20 13.82 45.16 94.43 
Cross-national personal contacts 35’982 72.02 94.22 42.47 94.46 
Age 38’505 39.12 11.63 18 60 
Muslim 38’505 .005 .07 0 1 
Orthodox 38’505 .003 .05 0 1 
Protestant 38’505 .23 .42 0 1 
Catholic 38’505 .44 .50 0 1 
 
Region: Eastern Europe 
Economic globalization 33’197 50.23 17.01 26.99 92.14 
Informational globalization 33’197 68.93 14.73 30.22 98.52 
Cross-national personal contacts 33’197 54.04 12.08 35.09 85.83 
Age 37’725 39.06 11.52 18 60 
Muslim 37’725 .15 .36 0 1 
Orthodox 37’725 .36 .48 0 1 
Protestant 37’725 .02 .14 0 1 
Catholic 37’725 .20 .40 0 1 
Notes: World Values Survey (2014) micro data 1981-2014 matched with KOF-ETH indices of globalization at the 
country-year level. The Jewish population in the MENA region resides almost entirely in Israel; the country fixed 
effect picks then up this religious denomination.  
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Table A2: Religious values and labor market participation in MENA countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Religious -0.459+ 
   
 
(2.14) 
   Religion is important: not very important (2) 
 
0.163 
  
  
(1.09) 
  Religion is important: somewhat important (3) 
 
-0.517+ 
  
  
(2.37) 
  Religion is important: very important (4) 
 
-1.035* 
  
  
(3.22) 
  God is important in life: (2) 
  
-0.276 
 
   
(0.64) 
 God is important in life: (3) 
  
0.062 
 
   
(0.25) 
 God is important in life: (4) 
  
0.381 
 
   
(1.09) 
 God is important in life: (5) 
  
-0.076 
 
   
(0.26) 
 God is important in life: (6) 
  
-0.047 
 
   
(0.21) 
 God is important in life: (7) 
  
-0.136 
 
   
(0.70) 
 God is important in life: (8) 
  
-0.154 
 
   
(0.95) 
 God is important in life: (9) 
  
-0.638** 
 
   
(3.33) 
 God is important in life: (10) very important 
  
-0.837** 
 
   
(4.38) 
 Confidence in church: (2) not very much 
   
-0.070 
    
(1.64) 
Confidence in church: (3) quite a lot and  
   
-0.404* 
    
(4.06) 
Confidence in church: (4) a great deal 
   
-0.742* 
    
(5.08) 
Region MENA MENA MENA MENA 
Estimation method Logistic Logistic Logistic Logistic 
Observations 18.232 20.487 19.840 18.278 
Countries 13 13 14 13 
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.184 0.193 0.191 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also 
of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
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fixed effects. Reference categories are: Religion is not important at all (1), God is not important at all (1), confidence 
in church: none at all (1). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A3: Religious values and labor market participation in European countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Religious -0.181** 
   
-0.371* 
    (3.32) 
   
(2.78) 
   Rel. imp.: (2) 
 
0.029 
   
-0.051 
   
 
(0.36) 
   
(0.83) 
  Rel. imp.: (3) 
 
-0.211* 
   
-0.206+ 
   
 
(2.67) 
   
(2.39) 
  Rel. imp.: (4) 
 
-0.473** 
   
-0.551** 
   
 
(5.16) 
   
(3.66) 
  God imp.: (2) 
  
0.186* 
   
0.033 
  
  
(2.98) 
   
(0.53) 
 God imp.: (3) 
  
0.076 
   
-0.020 
  
  
(1.00) 
   
(0.31) 
 God imp.: (4) 
  
-0.041 
   
-0.136 
  
  
(0.82) 
   
(1.83) 
 God imp.: (5) 
  
-0.121 
   
-0.107 
  
  
(1.65) 
   
(1.13) 
 God imp.: (6) 
  
-0.074 
   
-0.093 
  
  
(1.39) 
   
(1.01) 
 God imp.: (7) 
  
-0.070 
   
-0.116 
  
  
(0.99) 
   
(1.35) 
 God imp.: (8) 
  
-0.239* 
   
-0.233+ 
  
  
(3.26) 
   
(2.56) 
 God imp.: (9) 
  
-0.240+ 
   
-0.314* 
  
  
(2.51) 
   
(2.94) 
 God imp.: (10)  
  
-0.434** 
   
-0.564** 
  
  
(5.93) 
   
(4.60) 
 Conf. in church: (2)  
   
0.067 
   
0.012 
 
   
(0.96) 
   
(0.20) 
Conf. in church: (3)  
   
-0.078 
   
-0.165 
 
   
(0.82) 
   
(1.85) 
Conf. in church: (4)  
   
-0.413** 
   
-0.488** 
 
   
(4.20) 
   
(3.96) 
Region: Europe West West West West East East East East 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Observations 35’653 31’600 37’031 36’406 30’368 32’043 30’688 32’008 
Countries 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.096 0.098 0.101 0.174 0.176 0.170 0.177 
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Notes: Dependent variable is ‘employed’, with comparison category being ‘non-employed’ (unemployed, housewife, 
retired, other). All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also 
of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects. Reference categories are: non-members in religious groups, attendance of service: (1) never. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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1 Another channels through which identity expands to economic behavior is that identity constitutes a new type of 
externality in the sense that one’s actions can have (negative or positive) meaning for, or impact on, third persons. 
Akerlof & Kranton (2000).  
2 Similar findings on the negative effect of conservatism on female labor force participation are also reported for 
Latin America. See, for example, Contreras & Plaza (2010) for Chile, and Fernandez (2013) for the USA. 
3 The possible answers are recorded in four categories, ranging from ‘very important’, over ‘somewhat important’, to 
‘not important at all’ in the lowest category.   
4 We also find that economic globalization fosters ‘belief in hell’ at the 1 percent significance level. Because of the 
relatively small number of observations (12’000 observations for the MENA region and other regions) and mainly 
the cross-sectional identification strategy, we prefer not to include them in the table. 
5 The scale is the same as before: (1) none at all (2) not very much (3) quite a lot and (4) a great deal. 
6 In Europe (East and West combined), the impact of service attendance on female employment appears to be driven 
by Catholics, Muslims and persons who are not member of any of the four major religious groups (Catholics, 
Protestants, Muslims, Orthodox). For Protestants, some service attendance exerts a positive impact on female 
employment. Orthodox persons we observe some heterogeneity. In the MENA region, the non-importance of service 
attendance for female employment does not depend on respondent’s denomination.   
7	  Starting with the 1990s the sharp feminist critique against the male-breadwinner model, a new regime known as 
‘the adult worker model’ became dominant, encouraging employment for both men and women (Lewis, 2001). 
	  
	  
	  
